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Drill Here Not There: 
Petroleum Leasing and Conservation in 
Alaska’s National Petroleum Reserve 
 
Joel Aurora*
This Note analyzes the Department of the Interior’s recent decision to close off several 
million acres of the National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska (“NPR-A” or “Reserve”) 
from oil and gas leasing while allowing petroleum development on discrete areas of the 
Reserve. After discussing the Reserve’s history, this Note examines the Alaska National 
Interest Land Conservation Act of 1980 and its relevance to the NPR-A, and analyzes 
the petroleum industry’s potential legal arguments against the Interior’s decision. This 
Note also argues that the Department of the Interior’s decision is in accordance with its 
administrative powers because the Secretary’s decision should not be considered a 
formal public land “withdrawal,” but rather, a discretionary decision to deny lease 
issuances within certain areas of the Reserve. 
 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, 2014, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, and Executive 
Articles Editor of the Hastings Law Journal. I would like to thank Professor John Leshy for his 
expertise and guidance throughout earlier drafts of this Note. Also, many thanks to the staff of the 
Hastings Law Journal for their commitment to publishing exceptional scholarship issue after issue. 
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Introduction 
In December 2012, former Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar 
announced the Department of the Interior’s (“DOI” or the “Interior”) 
final proposal to allow for increased oil and gas development in the 
National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska (“NPR-A” or “the Reserve”).1 The 
Interior’s blueprint for the NPR-A, which the DOI finalized in February 
2013 through the issuance of a Record of Decision,2
 
 1. Press Release, Dep’t of Interior, Secretary Salazar Announces Plan for Additional 
Development, Wildlife Protection in 23 Million Acre National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska (Dec. 19, 
2012), available at doi.gov/news/pressreleases/secretary-salazar-announces-plan-for-additional-
development-wildlife-protection-in-23-million-acre-national-petroleum-reserve-alaska.cfm 
[hereinafter Salazar Announces Plan]. 
 will open up millions 
of Reserve acres to oil and gas drilling. The proposal also seeks to 
 2. Dep’t of the Interior, Record of Decision, National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska 
Integrated Activity Plan (Feb. 21, 2013). 
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protect wildlife populations such as caribou herds, migratory bird 
habitats, and coastal resources that are significant to the Alaska Natives 
and “our nation’s conservation heritage.”3 This decision, also known as 
the “preferred alternative,” will allow for oil and gas leasing on 11.8 
million acres of NPR-A land and designate 13.38 million acres in the 
NPR-A for protection from development.4
The Secretary’s decision came after lengthy consideration of five 
potential plans and the Interior’s receipt of over 400,000 public 
comments.
 
5 The four rejected alternatives varied in their balancing of 
potential development and environmental protection: one option sought 
to offer roughly half of NPR-A land to leases; another would have 
opened 57% of the Reserve; a third proposed 76%; and yet another 
advocated that 100% of NPR-A land be subject to oil and gas 
development.6 The preferred alternative will offer 52% of NPR-A 
subsurface land to oil and gas leases—an area with an estimated 549 
million barrels of discovered and undiscovered oil (72% of the entire 
Reserve’s estimated oil holdings),7 and 8.738 trillion cubic feet of 
discovered and undiscovered gas (50% of the entire Reserve’s estimated 
gas).8 The plan will also classify the remaining land as “special areas” 
closed to development.9
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the NPR-A land use decision has created 
controversy. In protest, Alaska Governor Sean Parnell sent a letter to 
Secretary Salazar in September 2012 withdrawing the state as a 




 3. Salazar Announces Plan, supra note 1. 
 
Before the preferred alternative was finalized, Alaska Senator Lisa 
Murkowski decried the plan for “den[ying] U.S. taxpayers both revenue 
and jobs at a time when our nation faces record debt and 
 4. Dep’t of the Interior, NPR-A IAP/EIS Alternatives, available at http://www.blm.gov/ 
pgdata/etc/medialib/blm/ak/aktest/planning/npr-a_iap_eis.Par.77255.File.dat/NPR-
A_IAPEIS_Alternative_comparison_table.pdf. A copy of this table is reproduced in Appendix A, infra. 
 5. Salazar Announces Plan, supra note 1. 
 6. See infra Appendix A. 
 7. As a point of comparison, the United States “consumed a total of 6.87 billion barrels [of oil] 
(18.83 million barrels per day) in 2011.” Frequently Asked Questions, How Much Oil Does the United 
States Consume Per Day, U.S. Energy Info. Admin. (Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/ 
faq.cfm?id=33&t=6. According to these statistics, if all the estimated oil contained in lands opened to 
leasing under the preferred alternative were to be fully exploited, the resulting production would 
supply the United States with enough oil to meet its consumption needs for about twenty-nine days. 
 8. The United States consumed approximately 25.46 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in 2012. 
Frequently Asked Questions, How Much Natural Gas Is Consumed (Used) in the U.S.?, U.S. Energy Info. 
Admin. (Apr. 30, 2013), http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=50&t=8. Thus, the if all the natural gas 
on allowable preferred alternative land was fully exploited, the resulting yields would supply the United 
States with enough natural gas to meet its consumption needs for about four to five months. 
 9. See infra Appendix A. 
 10. Letter from Gov. Sean Parnell to Sec’y of the Interior Ken Salazar (Sept. 12, 2012), available 
at http://gov.alaska.gov/parnell_media/resources_files/09122012_npra_salazar_copy2.pdf. 
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unemployment.”11
This Note analyzes the potential arguments that the oil and gas 
industry will mount in opposition to the “preferred alternative” and 
argues that the plan is entirely in accordance with the statutes governing 
the Reserve and Alaska’s public lands in general. First, this Note 
examines the historical context of the NPR-A and its originating statute. 
Next, this Note discusses the Alaska National Interest Land 
Conservation Act of 1980 (“ANILCA”)
 The oil and gas industry will also likely attack the 
Interior’s plan in court. 
12
I.  Background 
 and its relevance to the NPR-
A, specifically with regard to section 1326 of ANILCA—the so-called 
“no more” clause. Next, this Note examines the oil and gas industry’s 
potential legal arguments against the Interior’s decision, including the 
assertion that the Secretary is exercising a “withdrawal” power to protect 
special areas of NPR-A land from petroleum development, an action 
that is prohibited in certain circumstances under ANILCA. This Note 
contends that the Interior’s preferred alternative is not barred by 
ANILCA section 1326 because the Secretary’s action should not be 
considered a formal withdrawal. Instead, the preferred alternative should 
be viewed merely as a discretionary decision not to issue leases within 
certain areas of the Reserve. 
A. The National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska 
In 1923, President Warren Harding issued Executive Order 3797-A, 
which established Naval Petroleum Reserve Number 4 in northern 
Alaska to serve as an oil reserve for national defense purposes.13 At the 
time, “Harding noted that the future supply of oil for the Navy is at all 
times a matter of national concern.”14 By the 1970s, America’s energy 
needs had changed dramatically, and the oil embargo by the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries “established that the 
Nation had a need for oil that exceeded the needs of the Navy.”15
 
 11. Tim Bradner, Murkowski Slams NPR-A Plan, Conservation Groups Pleased, Alaska J. 
Commerce (Aug. 13, 2012, 1:47 PM), www.alaskajournal.com/Alaska-Journal-of-Commerce/August-
Issue-2-2012/Murkowski-slams-NPR-A-plan-conservation-groups-pleased. 
 In 
order to accommodate the increased demand for American petroleum, 
President Gerald Ford and Congress passed the National Petroleum 
Reserve Production Act of 1976 (“Production Act”), which gave the 
 12. Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2371 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16, 42, 
and 43 U.S.C.). 
 13. N. Alaska Envtl. Ctr. v. Norton, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1072 (D. Alaska 2005). 
 14. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 15. Id. 
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Reserve its current name and transferred authority over it from the Navy 
to the Interior.16
The NPR-A is the largest single unit of public land in the United 
States, covering 23.6 million acres (or nearly 37,000 square miles) on the 
Alaska North Slope, stretching from the Chuckchi Sea in the West to 
Colville River delta in the East, and from the Arctic Ocean in the North 
to the Brooks Range in the South.
 
17 The NPR-A and the Western Arctic 
region it inhabits boast some of the highest wilderness and wildlife values 
in North America, and the region sustains many species of fish and 
wildlife that are still utilized today for subsistence hunting by the Inupiat 
Natives.18 Indeed, four villages inhabited primarily by Alaska Natives 
exist within the Reserve’s boundaries, and the majority of these villagers 
practice subsistence lifestyles that depend on the natural resources of the 
NPR-A.19 Some of these indigenous populations oppose oil and gas 
drilling in the Reserve, largely because the presence of heavy industry 
frightens away the animals they hunt.20 Moreover, tribes have begun to 
experience their first cases of asthma-related illnesses.21
B. The Interior’s “Preferred Alternative” 
 Because of the 
sensitive ecosystems and local populations present in the Reserve, the 
Interior’s plan arguably sought to balance the interests of wildlife and 
native peoples with those of the oil and gas industry. 
Under the Secretary’s selected plan—known as “B2” or the 
“preferred alternative”—four special areas are designated as either 
unavailable to oil and gas leasing or unavailable to both leasing and the 
construction of new “non-subsistence” infrastructure—that is, 
infrastructure used to support petroleum production.22 NPR-A land not 
within these special areas will be open for petroleum leasing.23
The special areas designated by the Interior contain a rich 
abundance of wildlife and sensitive ecosystems. Perhaps the most well 
known of these areas is the Teshekpuk Lake Special Area in the 
Reserve’s Northeast region, which the preferred alternative has marked 
 
 
 16. 42 U.S.C. § 6502 (2012) (transferring authority over the NPR-A to the Interior and renaming 
the plan). 
 17. Brief for Appellant at 4, N. Alaska Envtl. Ctr. v. Norton, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1069 (2005) (No. 05-
35085), 2005 WL 1912173, at *4. 
 18. Background of the National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska, Audubon Alaska, 
http://ak.audubon.org/background-national-petroleum-reserve-alaska (last visited Apr. 24, 2014). 
 19. Kempthorne, 457 F.3d at 973. 
 20. Karin McDougal, Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, et al. v. Kempthorne: A Win for the Environment or 
an Example of NEPA’s Shortcomings?, 13 Drake J. Agric. L. 437, 439 (2008). 
 21. Id. 
 22. See infra Appendix A; see also Map of Proposed Alternative, infra Appendix B. 
 23. Id. 
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as unavailable both to leasing and new non-subsistence construction.24 In 
addition to housing the area’s dominant lake feature, the area also 
“includes important nesting, staging and molting habitat for a large 
number of waterfowl and shorebirds.”25 As much as thirty percent of the 
population of Brant goose on the Pacific flyway may be present in the 
Teshekpuk Lake Special Area during molting season.26 Additionally, the 
expanse near Teshekpuk Lake is a major calving area for the 
approximately 55,000-strong Teshekpuk Caribou Herd.27
To the South of the Teshekpuk Lake Special Area lies the Colville 
River corridor, a 2.44 million acre region
 
28 that the Interior has deemed a 
special area but nonetheless has not designated as off-limits to oil and gas 
leasing.29 The Colville River Special Area contains a high density of 
nesting raptors and “has been recognized since the 1950s as one of the 
most significant regional habitats for raptors in North America.”30
West of the Colville River, the Utukok Uplands Special Area is the 
primary calving ground for the Western Arctic Caribou Herd, which, at a 
population estimated at 325,000, ranks as Alaska’s largest caribou herd.
 
31 
Moreover, the Utukok Uplands provide crucial habitat for numerous 
wolverines and grizzly bears.32 Unlike the Colville River Special Area, 
the vast majority of the Utukok Uplands Special Area has been placed 
off limits to petroleum development and new non-subsistence 
infrastructure.33
Two other special areas—the Kasegaluk Lagoon and Peard Bay 
regions in the Reserve’s northwest—have also been designated as 
unavailable to leasing.
 
34 Offshore regions bordering these areas provide 
significant habitats for beluga whales, walruses, and numerous varieties 
of ice seals.35 Further, the Reserve’s northwest coast serves as a denning 
site for polar bears, which were listed as “threatened” under the 
Endangered Species Act in 2008.36
 
 24. See infra Appendix A. 
 
 25. 1 Dep’t of the Interior, Final Integrated Activity Plan/Environmental Impact 
Statement 355 (2012) [hereinafter Final IAP/EIS Vol. 1]. 
 26. Id. at 251. 
 27. Id. at 283. 
 28. Id. at 355. 
 29. See infra Appendix A. 
 30. Final IAP/EIS Vol. 1, supra note 25. 
 31. Id. at 287. 
 32. Id. at 298, 302. 
 33. See infra Appendix A. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Background of the National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska, supra note 18. 
 36. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of Threatened Status for 
the Polar Bear (Ursus Maritimus) Throughout Its Range, 73 Fed. Reg. 28,212, 28,212 (May 15, 2008) 
(codified as amended at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). 
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C. The National Petroleum Reserve Production Act of 1976 
In addition to transferring NPR-A land to the DOI, the Production 
Act required the Secretary to “commence further petroleum exploration 
of the reserve”37 and “conduct an expeditious program of competitive 
leasing of oil and gas in the [NPR-A].”38 The statute granted the 
Secretary discretion to promulgate rules and regulations for “the 
protection of environmental, fish and wildlife, and historical or scenic 
values” of the Reserve.39 It also provided that “[a]ny exploration within 
the Utukok River, the Teshekpuk Lake areas, and other areas 
designated by the Secretary of the Interior containing any significant 
subsistence, recreational, fish and wildlife, or historical or scenic value, 
shall be conducted in a manner which will assure the maximum 
protection” of these values to the extent consistent with the Production 
Act.40 In 1977, the Secretary relied on this authority to impose 
“maximum protective measures” to protect the migratory waterfowl and 
shorebirds of the Teshekpuk Lake Special Area.41 The Secretary also 
placed restrictions on low-level aircraft flights in order to protect the 
then-endangered Arctic Peregrine Falcon residing in the Colville River 
Special Area and caribou herds roaming in the Utukok River Uplands 
Special Area.42
Additionally, the Production Act ordered the DOI to conduct a 
study to determine “the best uses” for NPR-A land; to this end, the Act 
mandated that the study examine the Reserve’s mineral potential, 
indigenous populations, and its “scenic, historical, recreational, fish and 
wildlife, and wilderness values.”
 
43 This directive permitted the DOI to 
designate environmentally sensitive areas, making vast swaths of the 
NPR-A off limits to oil development.44 As one observer noted, 
“Congress has recognized the Reserve as a potential source for oil and 
gas exploration and production,” but Congress’s inclusion of numerous 
provisions in the Production Act regarding the environmental values of 
the Reserve “assur[ed] that environmental concerns would not be 
overlooked.”45
In other words, the plain language of the Production Act appears to 
balance the desire for petroleum exploration with the recognition of the 
 
 
 37. 42 U.S.C. § 6504(d) (2012) 
 38. Id. § 6506a(a). 
 39. Id. § 6503(b). 
 40. Id. § 6504(a). 
 41. National Petroleum Reserve in Alaska Designation of Special Areas, 42 Fed. Reg. 28,723, 
28,723 (June 2, 1977).  
 42. Id. 
 43. 42 U.S.C. § 6505(c)(1). 
 44. McDougal, supra note 20. 
 45. N. Alaska Envtl. Ctr. v. Norton, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1072 (D. Alaska 2005). 
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Reserve’s abundant flora and fauna. Although the NPR-A’s name may 
suggest otherwise, it is clear from the statute’s language that the 
Production Act sought to ensure that the Reserve would not be 
subjected to petroleum exploitation without due consideration of its 
impact on the region’s natural resources. 
D. Alaska’s Interest in Oil Development 
Predictably, Alaska is eager to expand the state’s oil and gas 
development because income from petroleum leases accounts for ninety 
percent of the state’s tax revenues.46 Alaska received $7 billion from oil 
companies in 2011, an increase from $6.2 billion the previous year, and 
nearly $8.9 billion in 2012.47 Largely because of the state’s oil revenue, 
Alaska now holds the largest cash reserves of any state, at $12.1 billion.48
State residents also stand to benefit from increased petroleum 
development because of annual dividends paid by a special state 
investment fund known as the Alaska Permanent Fund. The Fund, 
created by amendment to the Alaska state constitution in 1976, provides 
that “at least 25 percent of all mineral lease rentals” and other sources of 
mineral royalties be set aside for Alaska’s residents.
 
49 From 1982 through 
2009, the Fund paid about $17.5 billion in dividends to Alaskans through 
the annual distribution of dividend checks.50 These dividends are an 
important source of income for many Alaskans, especially those living in 
rural areas.51
Alaska is also interested in opening up the NPR-A because the 
Production Act mandates that fifty percent of all mineral leasing revenue 
on NPR-A land be paid to the state and spent at Alaska’s discretion, 
rather than remaining in the U.S. Treasury’s reserves.
 
52 Furthermore, 
production from the Prudhoe Bay field, situated east of the Reserve, is 
declining due to the depletion of the massive oil field’s initial discoveries, 
and active development on the periphery of Prudhoe Bay has been too 
small to fully offset the main field’s decline.53
 
 46. Maureen Farrell, Alaska’s Oil Windfall, CNN Money (Feb. 29, 2012, 5:57 AM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2012/02/29/markets/alaska_oil/index.htm. 
 Directly to the East of 
 47. Id.; Alaska’s Oil & Gas Industry, Alaska Resource Development Council, 
http://www.akrdc.org/issues/oilgas/overview.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2014). 
 48. Id. 
 49. What Is the Alaska Permanent Fund?, Alaska Permanent Fund Corp., http://www.apfc.org/ 
home/Content/aboutFund/aboutPermFund.cfm (last visited Apr. 24, 2014). 
 50. The Permanent Fund Dividend, Alaska Permanent Fund Corp., http://www.apfc.org/home/ 
Content/dividend/dividend.cfm (last visited Apr. 24, 2014). 
 51. Id. 
 52. 42 U.S.C. § 6506a(l) (2012). 
 53. History of Northern Alaska Petroleum Development, Am. Petroleum Inst., 
http://www.api.org/oil-and-natural-gas-overview/exploration-and-production/alaska/northern-alaska-
petroleum-development.aspx (last visited Apr. 24, 2014). 
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Prudhoe Bay lies the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, which is closed to 
oil development. Thus, the oil industry has set its sights West, to the 
NPR-A. 
II.  Legislative History of the Production Act 
Section 104 of the Production Act directs the Interior Secretary to 
incorporate environmental considerations into her determinations 
regarding the extent to which Reserve land is to be subjected to oil 
exploration. Specifically, the provision seeks to assure the maximum 
protection of wildlife and scenic values for the exploration of the 
Reserve within the Utukok River area, the Teshekpuk Lake area, and 
any other regions that the Secretary deems environmentally significant.54 
Notably, in language unusual among public land statutes, Congress 
mandated that oil exploration within these ecologically significant areas 
be “conducted in a manner which will assure the maximum protection of 
. . . surface values.”55 Here, as explained more below, it is significant that 
Congress used the words “assure the maximum protection,” rather than 
the “withdrawal” language typical of similar statutes because this 
language indicates that the preferred alternative is fully consistent with 
the power bestowed upon the Interior by the Production Act.56
The Production Act’s legislative history contains numerous 
indications of Congress’s intent not to make the entire swath of NPR-A 
land open to oil and gas drilling. Congress chose to allow for managed 
oversight of the Reserve, one that considers wildlife and scenic values 
alongside those of the petroleum industry. The Production Act 
Conference Committee’s Joint Statement (“Statement”), which describes 
the reconciled version of the House and Senate forms of the Production 
Act, stated the Committee’s intent to vest in the Interior the 
responsibility to consider environmental values “so that any activities 




The Statement noted that, “[w]hile ‘maximum protection of such 
surface values’ is not a prohibition of exploration-related activities within 
[sensitive NPR-A] areas, it is intended that such exploration operations 
 
 
 54. 42 U.S.C. § 6504(a). 
 55. Id. (emphasis added). 
 56. For detailed analysis of the Alaska National Interest Land Conservation Act’s (“ANILCA”) 
use of the term “withdrawal” and its applicability to the Reserve’s management prescriptions, see infra 
Part IV  
 57. H.R. Rep. No. 94-942, at 20 (1976) (Conf. Rep.) [hereinafter Conference Report]. Joint 
conference committee reports are highly influential pieces of legislative histories; indeed, former Chief 
Justice William Rehnquist once observed that “some types of legislative history are substantially more 
reliable than others,” and cited the report of a joint conference committee as an example of a superior 
form of legislative history. Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 17 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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will be conducted in a manner which will minimize the adverse impact on 
the environment.”58 The Statement noted explicitly that the Interior 
Secretary “may designate certain areas—including specifically the 
Utukok River area and the Teshekpuk Lake area—where special 
precautions may be necessary to control activities which would disrupt 
the surface values” of the region.59 Further, it was “expected that the 
Secretary [would] take every precaution to avoid unnecessary surface 
damage and to minimize ecological disturbances throughout the 
[R]eserve.”60
In discussions about the Statement on the floor of the House of 
Representatives, Rep. John Melcher, the House sponsor of the Act, 
stated the Conference Committee’s intent that oil and gas exploration on 
NPR-A land “be designed to minimize disturbance to fish and wildlife 
habitat and [that] exploration activities be planned so that interference 
with fish and wildlife populations during critical use seasons is 
curtailed.”
 
61 Melcher further elucidated the intent of the Production Act, 
which was “to carefully explore and determine the petroleum potential 
of the [R]eserve while simultaneously identifying and protecting other 
important resources[,] values[,] and uses.”62
The House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, which was 
closely involved in considering drafts of the House version of the 
Production Act, affirmed the importance of considering the wildlife and 
many other values of the vast Reserve land.
 
63 The Committee 
determined that the Secretary was “best qualified” to determine how to 
appropriately protect these values.64
Thus, the details provided by the Statement make it clear that the 
Production Act’s purpose was not to cede all of the NPR-A to oil and gas 
leasing. To the contrary, the committee’s statements highlighted above 
depict the Secretary’s discretionary power to carefully control the surface 
values of the area.
 
65 The use of the phrase “may designate” in the 
Conference Report66
 
 58. Conference Report, supra note 57, at 21. 
 further indicates the discretionary latitude 
bestowed upon the Secretary to preserve the Reserve’s wildlife and 
scenic values. Thus, the Interior’s preferred alternative is fully aligned 
with the Production Act’s language and its stated intent as outlined in the 
Conference Report and other forms of legislative history. This is 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. 122 Cong. Rec. 8886, 8887 (daily ed. Mar. 31, 1976) (statement of Rep. John Melcher). 
 62. Id. (emphasis added). 
 63. H.R. Rep. No. 94-81, pt. I, at 8 (1975). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Conference Report, supra note 57, at 20. 
 66. See Letter from Gov. Sean Parnell, supra note 10. 
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especially true with regard to the Interior’s decision to ban petroleum 
leasing in the Utukok River and Teshekpuk Lake areas,67
III.  ANILCA and the “No More” Clause 
 two 
particularly important and ecologically sensitive regions that were 
singled out by Congress as warranting additional protections. 
A. Background of ANILCA 
In 1980, President Jimmy Carter signed the Alaska National Interest 
Land Conservation Act, which “created numerous new federal 
properties in Alaska in order to maintain a ‘proper balance between the 
reservation of’ land for conservation and the disposition of ‘those public 
lands necessary and appropriate for more intensive use.’”68 The Act, 
designed in part as a major land conservation statute, sought to preserve, 
among other things, wildlife habitat: Alaska’s tundra, forest, and coastal 
rainforest ecosystems; the natural resources utilized by subsistence 
hunters; the recreational and scientific opportunities of the region; and 
the “unrivaled scenic and geological values associated with natural 
landscapes.”69
To this end, the Act provided for the creation of fifteen National 
Park Service properties, set aside roughly 97.5 million acres in new and 
expanded “conservation system units,” and created 56.4 million acres of 
wilderness.
 
70 ANILCA also provided for various studies regarding the 
efficacy of oil and gas exploration and the implementation of an oil and 
gas leasing program on certain Alaskan federal lands.71 Additionally, the 
law’s passage was fueled in part by strong opposition to numerous 
National Monument proclamations issued by President Carter and, as a 
result, ANILCA revoked many of these designations.72
B. ANILCA’s “No More” Clause 
 
Because Congress believed that ANILCA properly balanced 
environmental and economic interests, it determined that the statute 
obviated the need for subsequent legislation to conserve Alaska’s public 
 
 67. See infra Appendix A. 
 68. Se. Conference v. Vilsack, 684 F. Supp. 2d 135, 138 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 3101(d) 
(2012)). 
 69. 16 U.S.C. § 3101(d). 
 70. ANILCA defines “conservation system unit” as “any unit in Alaska of the National Park 
System, National Wildlife Refuge System, National Wild and Scenic Rivers Systems, National Trails 
System, National Wilderness Preservation System, or a National Forest Monument.” Id. § 3102(4). 
 71. See, e.g., id. § 3141 (outlining an overall study program for affected lands); id. § 3147 
(providing for an Arctic research study). 
 72. See id. § 3209(a). 
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land.73
No future executive branch action which withdraws more than five 
thousand acres, in the aggregate, of public lands within the State of 
Alaska shall be effective except by compliance with this subsection. To 
the extent authorized by existing law, the President or the Secretary 
may withdraw public lands in the State of Alaska exceeding five 
thousand acres in the aggregate, which withdrawal shall not become 
effective until notice is provided in the Federal Register and to both 
Houses of Congress. Such withdrawal shall terminate unless Congress 
passes a joint resolution of approval within one year after the notice of 
such withdrawal has been submitted to Congress. 
 Consequently, Congress inserted section 1326 into ANILCA, 
which has come to be known as the “no more” clause. Section 1326 
states: 
No further studies of Federal lands in the State of Alaska for the 
single purpose of considering the establishment of a conservation 
system unit, national recreation area, national conservation area, or for 
related or similar purposes shall be conducted unless authorized by this 
Act or further Act of Congress.74
Thus, the “no more” clause essentially sought to prevent the Executive 
from further conserving significant portions of Alaska’s public lands. By 




The “no more” clause will likely be invoked in the fight against the 
implementation of the preferred alternative. The oil and gas industry will 
likely argue that section 1326(a) clearly prohibits Executive withdrawals 
of more than 5000 acres of Alaskan federal land absent congressional 
approval. In all probability, Congress will not grant the Interior the 
necessary approval within one year of its decision. As a result, this 
13.38 million acre “withdrawal” of NPR-A land must terminate within a 
year of the preferred alternative’s issuance, and the Interior should then 
open the remaining area of the land to oil and gas development. 
 Alaska’s public lands, the “no more” clause 
was an attempt to halt the tide of conservation on such lands. 
As argued below, the Interior should respond that it is not 
exercising its withdrawal powers within the meaning of section 1326(a), 
but is merely operating under its statutorily prescribed discretionary 
power to designate some lands as unavailable to oil and gas leasing. Put 
another way, if the Interior is not exercising its withdrawal powers, it is 
not acting within the realm of the “no more” clause’s proscription on 
Executive withdrawals and, thus, it cannot be prevented from conserving 
more of Alaska’s public lands. 
 
 73. Id. § 3101(d). 
 74. Id. § 3213(a)−(b). 
 75. For a description of the meaning of “withdrawal,” see infra notes 76–82 and accompanying text. 
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C. Meaning of “Withdrawal” Under ANILCA Section 1326 
ANILCA does not define the term “withdrawal.” Thus, “[i]n the 
absence of a definition of the term in ANILCA, [courts] must look to 
how other, related statutes define withdrawal, as well as to the context in 
which the term is used in the statute at issue.”76
[W]ithholding an area of Federal land from settlement, sale, location, 
or entry, under some or all of the general land laws, for the purpose of 
limiting activities under those laws in order to maintain other public 
values in the area or reserving the area for a particular public purpose 
or program.
 One such statute is the 
Federal Land Policy Management Act of 1976 (“FLPMA”), for which 
the term “withdrawal”means:  
77
In other words, a withdrawal removes a portion of federal land from sale, 




Because numerous other ANILCA provisions mirror the FLPMA 
definition of withdrawal, it is reasonable and in accordance with the 
canons of statutory interpretation to apply the FLPMA definition to 
ANILCA’s use of the term.
 
79 For instance, ANILCA section 1322, which 
relates to the statute’s effect on withdrawals of land made prior to its 
enactment, states that withdrawn lands “shall not be deemed available 
for selection, appropriation, or disposition.”80 As the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia has held, use of the phrase 
“selection, appropriation, and disposition” in section 1322 reflects the 
phrase “settlement, sale, location or entry” used in the FLPMA 
definition of withdrawal.81
 
 76. Se. Conference v. Vilsack, 684 F. Supp. 2d 135, 143 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. 
Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 300–03 (2006); Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 564–65 (1988)). 
 
 77. 43 U.S.C. § 1702(j) (2012). Recent designations under the Antiquities Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 431–33 
(2012), have also utilized similar withdrawal language. See, e.g., Proclamation No. 8750, 76 Fed. Reg. 
68,625 (Nov. 7, 2012) (establishing Fort Monroe National Monument); Proclamation No. 8884, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 62,413 (Oct. 12, 2012) (establishing César E. Chávez National Monument); Proclamation No. 8868, 
77 Fed. Reg. 59,275 (Sept. 27, 2012) (establishing Chimney Rock National Monument); Proclamation 
No. 8803, 77 Fed. Reg. 24,579 (Apr. 25, 2012) (establishing Ford Ord National Monument). 
 78. See Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Hodel, 790 F.2d 760, 761 n.1 (9th Cir. 1986); see also New 
Mexico v. Watkins, 969 F.2d 1122, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“A withdrawal exempts the covered land 
from the operation of public land laws.”); Vilsack, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 143 (“[A] withdrawal exempts 
covered land from the operation of laws that otherwise authorize the transfer of federal lands to the 
private domain for private use.”). 
 79. See, e.g., Sorenson v. Sec. of Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 860 (1986) (“The normal rule of statutory 
construction assumes that identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have 
the same meaning.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of 
Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988) (“A provision that may seem ambiguous in 
isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme—because the same terminology is 
used elsewhere in a context that makes its meaning clear.”). 
 80. 16 U.S.C. § 3209(a). 
 81. Se. Conference, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 143. 
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Another ANILCA provision regarding a management plan for 
Alaska’s Bristol Bay mandated that specified lands “be withdrawn from 
all forms of appropriation under the public land laws.”82 This wording 
mirrors the FLPMA definition that a withdrawal serves to withhold land 
from disposal “under some or all of the general land laws.”83
Lastly, it is also reasonable to presume that Congress intended to 
import the FLPMA definition of withdrawal into ANILCA because 
FLPMA was passed in 1976, a mere four years before ANLICA. When 
ANILCA’s framers enacted the statute, they likely had FLPMA’s 
withdrawal definition in mind because the two laws were enacted within 
only a few years of each other and during a time of increased debate 
surrounding federal land use policy. 
 
D. Unique Wording of the “No More” Clause 
ANILCA’s “no more” clause proscribes “executive branch actions 
which withdraw,”84 as opposed to “executive withdrawals” or 
“withdrawals,” as the term is commonly used.85
Such an interpretation of Congress’s wording construes the “no 
more” clause as a shield against Executive actions that use traditional 
withdrawal mechanisms—such as the Antiquities Act, which authorizes 
traditional Executive withdrawals to preserve historical and natural 
landmarks
 Consequently, advocates 
for a broad interpretation of the “no more” clause could argue that the 
clause’s unique wording prohibits both traditional withdrawals and 
Executive actions that are similar to withdrawals, even if those actions do 
not rise to the level of a formal FLPMA “withdrawal.” Such a fine 
parsing of the “no more” clause would aid the oil and gas industry’s 
efforts to halt conservation in the Reserve, as a broad reading of the “no 
more” clause means that actions that are similar to, but technically 
distinct from, withdrawals would also fall under the clause’s ambit and 
further prohibit conservation attempts by the Executive branch. 
86
 
 82. 16 U.S.C. § 3183(f). 
—as well as those Executive actions that have the purpose 
 83. 43 U.S.C. § 1702(j) (2012). For other ANILCA provisions reflecting the Federal Land Policy 
Management Act definition of withdrawal, see, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 3200(a) (mandating that certain 
Alaskan lands be “withdrawn from all forms of entry or appropriation” under the mining and mineral 
leasing laws); 16 U.S.C. § 3142(i) (same); id. § 410hh-5 (directing that specified lands be “withdrawn 
from all forms of appropriation or disposal under the public land laws”). 
 84. Id. § 3213(a) (emphasis added). 
 85. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 1702(j) (defining “withdrawal” under FLMPA). 
 86. Id. §§ 431–33. The Antiquities Act authorizes the President to protect “historic landmarks, 
historical and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest” by declaring them 
national monuments. Id. § 431. Since the statute’s enactment, “large areas such as Grand Canyon, Death 
Valley, and Glacier Bay National Parks were first protected by Presidential proclamation under this 
statute. President Clinton revived the statute from nearly two decades of disuse, and employed it to 
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and effect of withdrawing land but are not named as such (in other 
words, de facto withdrawals). This argument, however, belies the plain 
language of the “no more” clause and advances a misguided 
interpretation of congressional intent. 
First, the canons of statutory interpretation support giving effect to 
the plain meaning of the “no more” clause, which on its face prohibits 
Executive branch withdrawals only in the traditional sense. Although the 
“no more” clause uses atypical phrasing, it still discusses Executive 
withdrawals and does not facially indicate that its purpose is to expand 
the meaning of a commonly understood term. It is a longstanding canon 
of statutory interpretation that Congress intends to use ordinary words in 
their ordinary senses, as “[i]t is elementary that the meaning of a statute 
must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is 
framed, and if that is plain . . . the sole function of the courts is to enforce 
it according to its terms.”87
Alternatively, even if opposition to the preferred alternative 
succeeded in convincing a court that the “no more” clause is facially 
ambiguous, the Interior could also rely on the statutory canon of in pari 
materia to argue that the scope of the “no more” clause is limited to 
traditional withdrawals. Under this interpretation, an ambiguous 
statute’s meaning may be determined in light of other statutes on the 
same subject matter.
 If Congress wanted ANILCA to use a 
different definition of “withdrawal” than is customary, it stands to reason 
that it would have included a definition of the term in the statute or at 
least provided a rationale for phrasing the “no more” clause in the 
manner that it did. Because this is not the case, courts should remain 
faithful to the plain meaning of the statute, which proscribes formal 
withdrawals in the traditional sense of the term. 
88
ANILCA’s legislative history further suggests reading the “no 
more” clause as a limitation only on Executive withdrawal powers as 
traditionally understood. The bill that eventually became ANILCA, 
House Report (“H.R.”) 39,
 Here, then, the Interior would point to the 
definitions of “withdrawal” in FLPMA—and as used in the Antiquities 
Act—in order to strengthen their argument that these definitions should 
be read into the “no more” clause. 
89
 
protect more acres of federal land than any chief executive other than Jimmy Carter.” George Cameron 
Coggins et al., Federal Public Land and Resources Law 24 (6th ed. 2007). 
 did not include section 1326 and similarly, 
“section 1326 was not included in the version of H.R. 39 reported to the 
full Senate by the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources 
 87. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917). 
 88. Black’s Law Dictionary 862 (9th ed. 2009) (defining in pari materia). 
 89. 126 Cong. Rec. S11,183−210 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1980). 
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(‘Senate Energy Committee’), which initially considered” H.R. 39.90 
Instead, advocates included the “no more” clause in a floor amendment 
as a substitute for the reported bill out of the Senate Energy 
Committee.91 As a result, there is little direct legislative history related to 
section 1326,92 but what does exist makes no indication that Congress 
intended to distinguish between “executive branch action which 
withdraws”93
When former Alaska Senator Ted Stevens officially introduced the 
“no more” clause on the Senate floor, his statements suggested that 
Congress did not consider the “no more” clause to encompass anything 
more than traditional, formal withdrawals. Stevens stated that the 
purpose of the “no more” clause was “to provide congressional oversight 
for major modifications of areas established or expanded by [ANILCA] 
and to require congressional approval for future major executive 
withdrawals of certain public lands in Alaska.”
 and the traditional definition of “withdrawal.” 
94 Stevens then read the 
amendment containing the “no more” clause, and in its original form the 
clause contained the potentially disputable language proscribing 
“executive branch action which withdraws” rather than simply 
“withdrawals.” In his remarks, however, Stevens did not make any 
explicit distinction between the two iterations, and in fact, his stated 
purpose for the amendment speaks of “executive withdrawals”95 rather 
than “executive branch action which withdraw[].”96
Along with the numerous references to other types of traditional 
withdrawals outlined in ANILCA,
 
97
Furthermore, much of the congressional support for ANILCA came 
from opposition to President Carter’s use of the Antiquities Act to 
withdraw seventeen tracts of Alaskan land between 1978 and 1980.
 Stevens’s interchangeable use of the 
two types of phrasing is strong evidence for reading the “no more” clause 
as an attempt to curtail the Executive withdrawal power in its traditional, 
statutorily defined sense. 
98 In 
addition to revoking these withdrawals,99
 
 90. Patton Boggs LLP, The Impact of ANILCA on the Potential Designation of the Coastal 
Plain of ANWR as a National Monument 7 (2000) [hereinafter Patton Boggs Brief]. 
 proponents of ANILCA’s “no 
 91. H.R. 39, 96th Cong. (as amended by Sen. Paul Tsongas, Amendment no. 1961, Apr. 17, 1980); 
126 Cong. Rec. S11,063 (daily ed. Aug. 18, 1980) (reporting Senator Tsongas calling up the modified 
amendment). 
 92. Patton Boggs Brief, supra note 90, at 10. 
 93. 16 U.S.C. § 3213(a) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 94. 126 Cong. Rec. at S11,054. 
 95. Id. at S11,052. 
 96. Id. at S11,054. 
 97. See infra Part IV.C. 
 98. See, e.g., Eric. C. Rusnak, The Straw That Broke the Camel’s Back? Grand Staircase—
Escalante National Monument Antiquates the Antiquities Act, 64 Ohio St. L.J. 669, 686–89 (2003). 
 99. 16 U.S.C. § 3209(a) (2012). 
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more” clause viewed the clause as a defense against future Executive 
withdrawals in Alaska pursuant to the Antiquities Act, under which 
Executive actions are always considered withdrawals in the traditional 
sense of the term.100
Former Alaska Senator Mike Gravel confirmed the Act’s intent to 
shield the state from future Antiquities Act pronouncements when he 
praised the “no more” clause for protecting his state against a future 
“President who will exercise against Alaska the injustice that took place 
at the hands of [President Carter] in his use of the Antiquities Act and at 
the hands of the [Interior] Secretary in his use of” FLPMA.
 
101 
Additionally, before the “no more” clause was inserted into ANILCA, 
Gravel sent a letter to the Senate Energy Committee expressing his 
desire for the insertion of “a provision barring further conservation 
system designations through administration action such as the 
Antiquities Act.”102 Gravel also praised section 1326(b) because it 
exempted Alaska “from the wilderness study provisions of FLPMA in 
the just belief that with passage of this bill enough is enough.”103 Because 
the Antiquities Act104
Consequently, it is clear from the canons of construction and 
ANILCA’s legislative history that the unique phrasing of section 1326 
does not permit it to proscribe actions other than withdrawals in the 
traditional sense of the word. Any argument suggesting otherwise would 
likely be dismissed as mere semantic quibbling. 
 and FLPMA are both classic withdrawal 
mechanisms, Gravel’s explicit mention of the need for protection against 
these statutes further indicates that Congress intended the “no more” 
clause to proscribe only formalistic withdrawals. 
IV.  The Preferred Alternative Does Not Propose a 
“Withdrawal” 
A. Implied Statutory Repeals Are Not Favored 
The Interior is fulfilling its statutory obligations under the 
Production Act by balancing the energy resources of the Reserve with 
environmental considerations. To interpret ANILCA’s “no more” clause 
as a restriction on that obligation would be akin to allowing ANILCA to 
implicitly repeal the Production Act. The Supreme Court has 
acknowledged that, while a statute can operate to amend or even repeal 
a previous statutory provision, “repeals by implication are not favored” 
and the “intention of the legislature to repeal must be clear and 
 
 100. Coggins, supra note 86, at 24. 
 101. 126 Cong. Rec. S11,183, S11,188 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1980). 
 102. S. Rep. No. 96-413, at 446 (1979). 
 103. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 104. For a list of recent withdrawals effectuated pursuant to the Antiquities Act, see supra note 77.  
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manifest.”105 A court should not infer a statutory repeal “unless the later 
statute expressly contradict[s] the original act or unless such a 
construction is absolutely necessary . . . in order” for a provision to retain 
meaning.106
The Court should not abandon its requirement for an explicit 
directive authorizing a statutory repeal. There is nothing in ANILCA—
neither in the “no more” clause nor anywhere else—that expressly 
manifests an intention to repeal the environmental provisions of the 
Production Act. Repeals by implication should be avoided,
 
107
The fact that Congress passed significant amendments to the 
Production Act just weeks after ANILCA’s enactment
 and the 
Production Act would retain its original intent if the “no more” clause 
was interpreted to find that the Interior’s discretionary actions pursuant 
to the Production Act do not constitute withdrawals. In other words, a 
court reviewing the Interior’s preferred alternative should hold that the 
flexible nature of the Interior’s leasing program is consistent with the “no 
more” clause. 
108 further suggests 
that Congress did not intend for the Production Act’s management 
prescriptions to conflict with the “no more” clause. One such Production 
Act reform required activities to consider “such conditions, restrictions, 
and prohibitions as the Secretary deems necessary or appropriate to 
mitigate reasonably foreseeable and significantly adverse effects on the 
surface resources” of the Reserve.109
Various other Production Act reforms passed shortly after 
ANILCA’s enactment also speak of the Secretary’s ability to consider 
natural resource conservation in NPR-A management decisions,
 This provision reauthorized the 
Secretary’s discretionary power to protect the Reserve’s abundant 
ecological treasures; indeed, the subsection’s use of the term 
“prohibitions” is especially applicable with regard to the Interior’s recent 
decision to prohibit oil and gas leasing on some of the Reserve’s land. 
110
 
 105. Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 267 (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation 
omitted). 
 
 106. Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 548 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 107. See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 549 (1974) (“[T]he cardinal rule . . . that repeals by 
implication are not favored.”). 
 108. Kunaknana v. Clark, 742 F.2d 1145, 1147 (9th Cir. 1984) (describing the plaintiff’s assertion 
that a primary objective of ANILCA, “enacted just weeks before the [Production Act] was amended, 
was to provide the opportunity for rural residents engaged in a subsistence way of life [the 
opportunity] to do so” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 109. 42 U.S.C. § 6506a(b) (2012). 
 110. See id. § 6506a(j)(1) (permitting NPR-A oil and gas lessees to unite with each other to operate 
under a single agreement “for the purpose of conservation of the natural resources” and “if the 
Secretary determines the [lessee unification] action to be necessary or advisable in the public interest,” 
with “public interest” defined to include considerations of the “impact to surface resources of the 
leases”); id. § 6506a(k)(1)(A) (authorizing the Secretary to “waive, suspend, or reduce the rental fees 
or minimum royalty” on leaseholds in order to encourage increased oil and gas recovery or “in the 
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further signaling Congress’ intent for the Reserve to be managed with 
attention to both industry and environmental interests. Perhaps most 
importantly, the 1980 Production Act reforms explicitly continued the 
protections outlined in the Act’s original section 104(a), which maintains 
that oil exploration near the Utukok River and Teshekpuk Lake areas, 
along with any other NPR-A areas the Secretary deems ecologically 
significant, shall be subject to maximum protections.111
Especially when viewed in light of its chronological proximity to 
ANILCA’s enactment, the increased environmental safeguards provided 
for in the Production Act amendments indicate that Congress did not 
intend decisions such as the Interior’s preferred alternative to be subject 
to the constraints of ANILCA section 1326. If Congress had intended 
such discretionary management decisions to be withdrawals for the 
purposes of ANILCA, it would not have promoted conservation and 
ecological planning in the Production Act just a few weeks after 
ANILCA’s passage. If it had wanted this result, it is reasonable to 
assume that Congress would have explicitly pulled the new Production 
Act provisions under the guise of the “no more” clause at the time of 
their enactment or, at the very least, omitted much of the conservation 
language from the Production Act reforms. The cases described in the 
following two sections serve as additional evidence that the preferred 
alternative does not constitute a “withdrawal” under ANILCA. 
 
B. SOUTHEAST CONFERENCE V. VILSACK 
Courts have properly concluded that the Executive’s conservation 
efforts in Alaska do not rise to the level of formal “withdrawals.” For 
example, a court hearing an allegation that the preferred alternative’s 
refusal to issue leases constitutes a prohibited withdrawal under the “no 
more” clause should look to the reasoning of the D.C. District Court in 
Southeast Conference v. Vilsack112
In Southeast Conference, several cities and nonprofit corporations in 
Alaska brought suit against the U.S. Forest Service, alleging that the 
Forest Service’s plan to reduce the amount of available land in the 
Tongass National Forest for timber harvesting violated the “no more” 
clause.
 for guidance. 
113
 
interest of conservation”); id. § 6506a(k)(3) (articulating the procedures involving a lessee’s 
suspension of payments “[i]f the Secretary, in the interest of conservation,” suspends a lessee’s 
petroleum production). 
 Similar to the preferred alternative, the plan at issue in 
Southeast Conference sought to promote “the ecological, social, and 
economic values derived from” the 16.8 million acre Tongass National 
 111. Id. § 6506a(n)(2) (“[A]ny exploration or production undertaken pursuant to this section shall 
be in accordance with section 6504(a) of this title.”). 
 112. Se. Conference v. Vilsack, 684 F. Supp. 2d 135, 143 (D.D.C. 2010). 
 113. Id. 
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Forest in Southeast Alaska.114 To this end, the Forest Service allowed 
timber harvesting on vast swaths of Tongass Forest land, but also 
designated 1.22 million acres as “old growth reserves” and prohibited 
timber harvesting on these lands.115
The plaintiffs in Southeast Conference contended that the “old 
growth reserves” designation “withdr[ew] more than 5,000 acres from the 
timber harvest” and thereby violated the “no more” clause.
 
116 The 
Southeast Conference court, however, rejected this argument. After 
extensive explanation showing that the FLPMA definition of 
“withdrawal” should also be used in the context of ANILCA’s “no 
more” clause, the court concluded that the Forest Service’s action did not 
constitute a withdrawal because there was no evidence “that the [old 
growth reserve] designations here have the effect of suspending any 
public land laws,” an essential element of a formal “withdrawal.”117 
Instead, the designation was simply an example of the Forest Service’s 
legislatively mandated responsibility to plan for multiple uses of federal 
land.118
Much like the plan for the Tongass National Forest, the preferred 
alternative represents adherence to the Interior’s statutory responsibility 
under the Production Act to “assure the maximum protection of” the 
land’s significant ecological and scenic values.
 
119 Additionally, the 
Interior’s refusal to issue leases on certain Reserve lands should not be 
considered a withdrawal because, much like the designation of “old 
growth reserves” at issue in Southeast Conference, the preferred 
alternative “neither exempt[s] lands from the operation of public land 
laws nor suspend[s] the operation of those laws on certain lands.”120 A 
land-use designation such as the one outlined in the preferred alternative 
simply has “no effect on laws that authorize the transfer of federal lands 
to the private domain.”121 In fact, the only court to consider the 
contention that “land use designations are withdrawals summarily 
rejected it.”122
The Interior’s defense of the preferred alternative may actually be 
stronger than its defense of the old growth reserves in Southeast 
Conference. Under the National Forest Management Act (“NFMA”), 
the Forest Service was obliged to outline a detailed “plan” for Tongass 
 
 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 139. 
 116. Id. at 141. 
 117. Id. at 144. 
 118. Id. 
 119. 42 U.S.C. § 6504 (2012). 
 120. Vilsack, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 144. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. (citing Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Lyons, 871 F. Supp. 1291, 1315 (W.D. Wash. 1994)). 
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management,123
C. BOB MARSHALL ALLIANCE V. HODEL 
 whereas the Production Act mandates no such action. 
NFMA’s formalistic management plan requirements are more in line 
with FLPMA’s procedural withdrawal requirements, which stand in 
contrast to the discretionary authority that the Production Act provides 
to the Secretary. Put another way, because the Production Act does not 
explicitly mandate that the Interior promulgate a “plan” for management 
of the Reserve, the Production Act does not rise to the same level of 
procedural formality outlined in NFMA or FLPMA. As a result, the 
preferred alternative presents an even stronger case than Southeast 
Conference for withstanding a “no more” clause attack because the 
Production Act’s lack of formalistic planning requirements could be 
viewed as a substantial discretionary allowance to the Interior rather 
than a blueprint for rigid withdrawal proceedings. Bob Marshall Alliance 
v. Hodel also bolsters the argument that the preferred alternative does 
not advocate a formal Executive withdrawal. 
In Bob Marshall Alliance v. Hodel,124 the Ninth Circuit interpreted 
FLPMA’s definition of “withdrawal,” to institute the rule that a 
“‘[w]ithdrawal’ of public lands requires a formal procedure which, for 
parcels exceeding 5000 acres, includes congressional approval; the land is 
effectively segregated from the operation of public land laws for a period 
of up to 20 years.”125 In Bob Marshall, wilderness groups brought suit 
against the Interior, other federal agencies, and private lessees to 
challenge the issuance of oil and gas leases in Montana’s Lewis and Clark 
National Forest.126 One of Bob Marshall’s defendant lessees, in an 
argument similar to one the oil and gas industry could mount against the 
preferred alternative, asserted “that if the agencies had either denied or 
deferred action on . . . lease applications, their action would have 
constituted an illegal administrative ‘withdrawal’ of [the region] from 
mineral leasing.”127
In support of this assertion, the defendant lessee cited Mountain 
States Legal Foundation v. Andrus,
 
128 in which the plaintiff alleged that 
the inaction of the Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management on 
applications for oil and gas leases in national forests constituted a 
“withdrawal” under FLPMA.129
 
 123. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(a) (2012). 
 The Mountain States court agreed, 
stating that the agencies effectively placed large areas of federal land off 
 124. 852 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 125. Id. at 1229. 
 126. Id. at 1224–25. 
 127. Id. at 1229. 
 128. 499 F. Supp. 383 (D. Wyo. 1980). 
 129. Id. at 386. 
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limits from oil and gas leasing in order to protect wildlife.130 The U.S. 
District Court in Wyoming then declared that “[w]e cannot allow the 
[d]efendants to accomplish by inaction what they could not do by formal 
administrative order.”131
But Bob Marshall rejected this analysis, declaring that “Mountain 
States is not binding on us and we do not find its reasoning persuasive.”
 
132
We fail to see how a decision not to issue oil and gas leases . . . would 
be equivalent to a formal withdrawal. [Defendant] cites only one case, 
Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Andrus, as authority for the 
proposition that deferring action on oil and gas lease applications can 
constitute an unlawful administrative withdrawal. . . . In that case, the 
court concluded that the Interior and Agriculture Departments had 
illegally withdrawn over a million acres of land because they had failed 
to act on oil and gas lease applications and had thereby removed the 
land from the operation of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920. Yet as the 
court acknowledged, the Mineral Leasing Act gives the Interior 
Secretary discretion to determine which land are to be leased under the 
statute. We have held that the Mineral Leasing Act allows the 
Secretary to lease such lands, but does not require him to do so. . . . 
[T]he Secretary has discretion to refuse to issue any lease at all on a 
given tract.
 
The Ninth Circuit elaborated: 
133
Just as with the mineral leases in Bob Marshall, the Interior has 
authorization to use its discretion to determine the specific NPR-A areas 
to be subjected to oil and gas leases. As noted in Part II, the Production 
Act contains provisions detailing the Reserve’s importance as a source of 
domestic petroleum and a significant ecological resource. Thus, similar to 
the Bob Marshall court’s conclusion that the Mineral Leasing Act grants 
the Secretary discretion to issue oil and gas leases, ANILCA’s attempt to 
strike a balance between petroleum exploration and environmental 
considerations leaves the Secretary discretion to refuse issuing leases on 
given tracts of the Reserve.
 
134
In fact, some provisions of ANILCA explicitly exempt leasing 




 130. Id. at 391, 397. 
 Thus, the 
statutory scheme established by the Production Act and ANILCA 
governing petroleum development and environmental management on 
NPR-A land is analogous to the mineral leasing at issue in Bob Marshall. 
A court considering the Interior’s decision not to issue leases on various 
 131. Id. 
 132. Bob Marshall, 852 F.2d at 1230. 
 133. Id. at 1229–30 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted). 
 134. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 3148 (2012) (outlining the oil and gas leasing program for Alaskan lands 
and granting leeway to the Secretary to approve or deny leases). 
 135. Id. § 3148(a). 
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tracts of Reserve land should afford the agency the same discretionary 
freedom as it was granted in Bob Marshall. 
Accordingly, Southeast Conference and Bob Marshall strongly 
support the assertion that the protection of land under the preferred 
alternative does not constitute a “withdrawal” under ANICLA. Thus, 
the preferred alternative does not contravene the “no more” clause and 
should be upheld by any court that reviews it. 
Conclusion 
The Interior’s recent decision to open roughly half of NPR-A land 
to petroleum leasing while placing the rest of the Reserve off limits to 
such leases represents a measured approach to federal land-use planning. 
The preferred alternative balances multiple interests through its 
protections for much of the area’s abundant ecological resources and 
allows for the development of nearly three-quarters of the Reserve’s 
estimated petroleum holdings. The execution of the preferred alternative 
neither contravenes the “no more” clause nor any other statutory 
provisions. In fact, the preferred alternative is in full compliance with the 
Interior’s responsibilities the Production Act and ANILCA. As a result, 
any future court reviewing a challenge to the preferred alternative should 
respect the Interior’s decision and allow the various stakeholders to 
proceed under the preferred alternative as it stands. 
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Appendix A: NPR-A IAP/EIS Alternatives: Major Land 
Allocations & Estimates of Economically Recoverable Oil & Gas 
Land 
Allocation 









13 million acres 








11 million acres 






11.8 million acres (52% of 
NPR-A subsurface; current 
deferrals honored until 
expiration) 
17.9 million 








































5 (13.35 million acres) 
TLSA: 3.65 million 
acres 
CRSA: 2.44 million 
acres 
URUSA: 7.06 million 
acres 
KLSA: 97,000 acres 
PBSA: 107,000 acres 
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